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Increasingly, policymakers have resorted to regulation of private corporate
activity as a means of achieving socially desirable ends (Schultze 1977;
Leone 1977). Despite this growth in regulation, there has been little
investigation of the dynamic political process by which regulations are
formulated and implemented. There has also been little systematic analysis
of the dynamic economic process of regulatory compliance.
Several aspects of the regulatory approach to public problem solving
merit investigation. Perhaps the most obvious question is whether
regulations achieve desired ends. It is certainly possible for Congress to
mandate certain goals and to establish bureaucratic machinery to promul-
gate the necessary rules; yet these two acts alone do not guarantee
attainment of the stated objectives. We leave examination of this most
basic question to others who are already so engaged.
1
To address these questions we present a model of policy-development
processes and industry-response processes. At the core of this model
are the economic costs and benefits created by regulation and their distri-
bution among firms and regions. Analysts customarily measure total
benefits and a limited set of aggregate total costs estimated by comparing
the equilibrium prices and outputs predicted with the static economic
model.
2 Our model provides for the important role that distributional
effects and industry dynamics play in determining regulatory impacts.
Distributional effects are required because, among other things, they
create many pressures on the political organizations that develop and
administer policies. The dynamic analysis is motivated by the hypothesis
that the constraints and difficulties firms encounter in the short run in
attempting to adjust to specific regulations have important aggregate and
distributional implications. These short-run effects relate to the availability
of capital and the ease with which different firms can adjust their capital
stock and their manufacturing and marketing strategies to new conditions.Leone and Jackson 232
Economic Impacts of Regulation
Our analysis begins with costs. The costs of regulation are more difficult
to define and more uncertain than those of other public activities. In
public-works projects, for example, the principal cost uncertainties are
organizational (such as unforeseen delays and unanticipated obstacles to
construction) and economic (inflation), and are largely exogenous to
decisions about the project itself. Costs of most business regulations also
are subject to organizational and external economic uncertainties. But, in
addition, these costs depend on factors internal to the regulated industry
(such as the rate and direction of technological change), on the existence
of capacity pressures within an industry, and on differences in costs
between new and existing facilities. Costs also are sensitive to uncertainties
created by the regulatory process itself: How much time will be left for
compliance? Are standards likely to change? Will enforcement be uniform
and equitable? Stated differently, the definition of costs for a public-works
project is basically an engineering and managerial exercise; the identifica-
tion of costs associated with a business regulation is primarily an exercise
in dynamic economic and political analysis, with all the attendant diffi-
culties and uncertainties this implies. This distinction is intended to stress
the variety of methodological approaches that may be required to analyze
regulatory policies.
When not seen from an engineering perspective, costs usually are
viewed from the standpoint of the competitive-market model and asso-
ciated static equilibrium. Viewed this way, regulations prohibit certain
production processes, require additional capital and operating expendi-
tures, and increase some factor prices, thus shifting the long-run supply
curve within an industry upward. This method is deficient in two impor-
tant ways: It only estimates aggregate costs, and it ignores all short-run
and dynamic adjustment problems.
Distribution of Economic Impacts
The focus on total costs obscures some very important characteristics of
regulatory costs. From the standpoint of aggregate efficiency, compari-
sons of total costs and estimated benefits may be an appropriate decision
criterion. However, decisionmakers' objectives are not solely focused on
this criterion. Hidden within any specific set of aggregate costs are highly
variable consequences for different plants within a firm, for firms within
an industry (and among industries, for that matter), and for regions of the
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Figure 5.1 Compliance-cost curve.
objectives, such as antitrust goals or regional development concerns. At
the same time, the firms and regions most affected presumably will work
to influence policy choice. Thus, any eventual policies will not be based
simply on aggregate efficiency effects, but will reflect accommodation to
political pressures created by distributional effects.
3
Estimating the distributional impacts of national policies is particularly
difficult. For a variety of reasons, the incidence of compliance costs
within an industry and among regions need not be uniform. Plant-to-plant
differences in costs may be quite large, depending on the nature of regula-
tions, the ages and values of existing capital stocks, and the constraints
placed on manufacturing processes by regulations.
However, if the cost structure of each plant in an industry were known,
we could measure disaggregated effects of regulatory policies from shifts
in the cost curve of each plant brought about by new regulations; and if
individual plants were then arrayed in descending order according to their
average unit costs, an industry cost curve could be generated.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of industry costs due to a hypothetical
regulation that results when the compliance costs of individual plants are
arrayed in descending order. The vertical axis represents the unit cost of
compliance, the horizontal industry capacity. For this hypothetical regula-
tion, 60 percent of the industry (in terms of capacity) can comply with
a unit cost increase of $1 or less, while for 10 percent of capacity com-
pliance increases costs by more than $5 per unit of output.Leone and Jackson 234
The importance of figure 5.1 is that it can be used to determine which
plants will be hardest hit by proposed regulations and which actually
may benefit. If an aggregate economic analysis at the industry level
yields an overall price increase of $2, close to 75 percent of industry
capacity will receive revenue increases that exceed their compliance costs.
For the remaining proportion of the industry capacity, represented by
the rightmost portion of the curve, the regulations entail an economic
loss.
Identifying where individual plants fall on the cost curve is an important
component of our impact analysis. Even if the aggregate costs are less than
the aggregate benefits, the incidence of costs on certain plants may conflict
with other policy objectives, raising questions of whether a program should
be implemented. For example, various national policies encourage com-
petition in manufacturing industries and try to prevent the economic
decline of various regions. Yet if heavily impacted plants are those of
smaller producers or are concentrated in a specific region, the effects of
proposed regulations may be to increase concentration in an industry or
to exacerbate regional economic disparities. These possible deleterious
effects ought to be identified and considered prior to the promulgation
of regulations. Other governmental tools may make it possible to over-
come such unwanted side effects, but they are seldom used when regu-
lations are taking effect and are altering the structures of industries and
the regional distribution of jobs and income.
Short-Run Economic Impacts
Accurate assessment of intraindustry and interregional impacts requires
understanding how individual plants may respond to proposed standards,
in both the short and the long run. Thus, we try to model how regulatory
constraints affect representative plants and how effects on individual
plants are distributed among firms and regions. This requires identifi-
cation of the age and other attributes of the capital stock of various
plants, their specific production processes, and their existing effluent
control measures. It becomes critical to specify required production
changes and capital investments for various plants. These conditions
determine both short- and long-run consequences for the industry. New
plants may have compliance costs substantially different from those of
older plants.
Identification of short-run distributional effects becomes very impor-
tant when considering alternative regulatory policies. Firms and regions





Figure 5.2 Short-run and long-run equilibrium. D: demand. SSR: supply, short-run
(based on ascending average variable costs). SLR: supply, long-run (based on total
economic costs, including return on investment). QLR, QSR: equilibrium quantity,
long-run and short-run respectively. PLR, PSR: equilibrium price, long-run and short-run
respectively.
temporarily—are likely to mount campaigns aimed at altering the
regulations, weakening their enforcement, or simply preventing further
regulation. Conversely, firms and regions benefiting from regulations,
either because they receive benefits at relatively low cost or because they
gain financially, can be expected to oppose changes in regulations.
Our model is expanded to consider short-run effects as well as distri-
butional impacts. In figure 5.2 we depict a demand curve (D), a short-run
supply curve (SSR), and a long-run supply curve (SLR). For the moment,
assume that D does not change over time. SSR is an upward-sloping
curve which, as described, arrays individual plants in an industry
according to ascending average variable costs.
SLR is drawn as a horizontal line, representing the underlying
assumption that in the long run an effectively unlimited supply of new
capacity can be brought on line at the average total cost (including a
return to capital) of the lowest-cost source of new capacity.
Understanding the relationship between SSR and SLR is critical to
determining the impact on industry of a government regulation. As drawn
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Figure 5.3 Short-run and long-run equilibrium with added costs of regulation (case 1;
PSR' < PLR'). TEC: total economic costs of regulation (including return on investment).
VC: variable costs of regulation. All variables with prime are the after-regulation
equivalents of the unprimed variables. See figure 5.2 for definitions of other abbreviations.
have depicted new capacity as relatively inexpensive—owing, perhaps,
to scale advantages, technical change, or factor substitution. The point,
of course, is that the actual relationship between SLR and SSR is an
empirical question.
Furthermore, the path the industry follows from SSR to SLR depends
on a number of factors, perhaps the most significant of which is the
economic longevity of existing facilities. Thus, as drawn in figure 5.2,
the long-run equilibrium quantity QLR is less than the short-run equili-
brium quantity QSR. The time path of adjustment from QSR to QLR
depends on how rapidly the existing capacity is retired.
If the highest variable cost capacity is retired first, then at some
intermediate point in time the supply curve will be marked by the points
ABC and the long-run price and output levels will have been reached.
As more old facilities are retired the supply curve will continue to shift
from ABC to SLR, but in so doing it will merely dissipate the quasirents
of existing facilities without influencing price and output levels.
4
In figure 5.3 government regulation is imposed on this situation, and
its costs shift both the short- and long-run supply curves upward. Consider
first the impact on the short-run curve. The curve labeled SSR + TEC









Figure 5.4 Short-run and long-run equilibrium with added costs of regulation (case 2;
PSR' > PLR).
(including a return on investment) of the government regulation. No
rational firm in a fully informed and perfectly competitive market will
comply with a regulation unless it can expect to recover the full costs
of compliance. This cost recovery need not imply price increases equal
to cost increases, however. As part of this recovery, the profit-maximizing
firm will count contributions to sunk costs of all prior investments,
which it would have to forgo if it did not comply. This new curve is a
combination of variable and total economic costs. The maximum
capacity a rational firm will bring into compliance will be QSR.
Once compliance investment decisions have been made, short-run
behavior will be predicated on an industry's variable cost structure. The
curve marked SSR + VC in figure 5.3 is such a curve, for it reflects the
old short-run supply curve, the variable costs of government regulation,
and the capacity constraint implied by QSR. This short-run curve is
now vertical at the desired quantity level, because government regulations
force firms to rationalize the industry's capital stock.
A similar vertical shift in SLR is due to added costs of regulation for
new facilities. Again, depending on the rate of retirement of old capacity,
there is a time path of adjustment from PSR', OSR' to PLR', OLR'.
Nothing in this logic just described requires PLR' to be greater than
PSR'. Indeed, if the costs of retrofitting existing capacity are high and
the incremental costs of compliance in new facilities are low, it is quite
possible for PSR' to exceed PLR' (see figure 5.4.)Leone and Jackson 238
Obviously, government regulation, by shifting long-run supply costs,
will influence the total size of an industry; as depicted, however, it will
not influence profit margins of new plants. However, returns (or quasi-
rents) to existing plants will be materially affected by both the height of
any vertical shift in the supply curve and the time path of adjustment
to the new long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, the economically critical
factor is not the average vertical shift, but the shift that occurs at the
relevant margin. This may be more or less than the average. For example,
if any industry's high-cost producers also have relatively high compliance
costs, then the marginal cost of compliance will exceed average costs
and new quasirents will be created by regulation. If compliance costs of
marginal facilities are low, then regulation will dissipate some quasirents.
(In both cases, some quasirents are terminated as the industry contracts.)
Whether the net impact on rents is positive or negative is an empirical
question we will address below in the context of tissue manufacturing.
It should be clear that to calculate impacts of regulations we must
consider short-run effects, and not merely show differences in long-run
costs, prices, and outputs. To obtain a better estimate of regulatory
costs, the observed time stream of these cost and price increases needs
to be discounted.
The above discussion was predicated on the assumption of constant
demand. More realistically, demand is likely to shift over time. In some
instances, this shift will be upward (as income grows, for example); in
other instances, the shift will be to downward (as when lower-cost foreign
supplies become available). The addition of a dynamic element to demand
only reinforces our conclusion on the importance to impact analysis of
the time path an industry follows in adjusting to government regulation.
In this same vein, any movement from a short-run to a long-run
equilibrium requires investment, the timing of which can significantly
influence the costs of compliance. For example, Leone et al. (1975) con-
cluded that the annualized price per ton customers would pay as a result
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 could
be as low as $2.45 per ton if expenditures for pollution-control devices
did not necessitate deferral of investments in production capacity. In
contrast, if investments in new capacity were deferred on a dollar-for-
dollar basis to allow for financing of pollution control devices, the
annualized price per ton could be as high as $14.20. Under both as-
sumptions, the estimated long-run (15-20 years) price per ton was
virtually the same, as would be expected.
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Furthermore, short-run costs may have substantial impacts in the long
run because they may seriously affect the competitive structure of an
industry. If high short-run costs fall disproportionately on the smaller,
more marginal plants and firms within an industry, these firms may not
be able to stay in business. The result would be a more oligopolistic
industry by the time the "long run" was attained. If this is the case,
then long-run market conditions will be different from those described
by the competitive-market equilibrium discussed above.
There is one further important reason for considering these short-run
distributional effects: Members of the public at large, as well as various
interest groups, may substantially alter their support for intended policy
objectives if they do not perceive the costs initially or if they feel they
are bearing a disproportionate share of the costs. People may favor
improving water quality and support legislation promising to do so
when costs of the program are as vague and hidden as they are in the
environmental area; they may also change their positions radically once
costs are perceived.
In her insightful article, Dorfman (1975) estimates the total economic
costs of air and water pollution-control programs passed in the 1970s
and shows that the near-term costs are substantially greater than the
long-run costs. She further suggests that the vast majority of these costs
are in the form of higher industry costs, which will be passed on to
consumers. We think it is fair to speculate that these costs may not
have been accurately perceived and fully discussed when the legislation was
passed and may have turned out to be far greater than what the public
is willing to pay for improved environmental quality. Once these costs
begin to be perceived, which will occur as regulations are written and
enforced, political support for these programs may erode. Our model of
policy development must take such changing forces into account.
We have briefly outlined the model necessary to define and measure
economic impacts of proposed regulations on an industry. The remainder
of this paper applies the model to development of the 1972 amendments
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and subsequent rulemaking
by the EPA for the pulp and paper industry. We hope to demonstrate
how the model is estimated in practice, to indicate the magnitudes of
quasirents being created and dissipated by the EPA, and to show where
and how costs and rents influence regulatory policy.Leone and Jackson 240
Economic Impacts and Congressional Consideration of Water-Pollution
Regulations
The 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
represent a major turning point in the public approach to water-pollution
control. Previous legislation required state enforcement of policies based
on local water quality. There was a general feeling that this approach
had not been effective because each state had a considerable incentive
to protect its economic base and thus not to set or enforce strong standards.
The 1972 amendments decreed that policy would now be based on
uniform effluent standards defined and enforced by the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency, regardless of the quality of the receiving
water or local economic impacts. The act, as passed over a presidential
veto, established 1985 as the date for "ending all discharge of pollutants"
(EDOP) and set interim standards for 1977 based on "best practicable
technology" (BPT) and for 1983 based on "best available technology"
(BAT). Not only are the costs of attaining these standards large; they
are anything but uniform in their economic impact on different regions
and on competitors within an industry.
The passage of this legislation provides important clues about possible
reasons for continued use of the regulatory approach to solve important
social problems. Prior to passage, there had been growing concern among
the American people about environmental problems. Opinion polls
record that between 1965 and 1970 the proportion of persons who said
water pollution was a "serious" or "very serious" problem rose from
35 percent to 74 percent (Erskine 1972).
Numerous politicians tried to capitalize on this concern by proposing
new legislation. The most notable was Senator Edmund Muskie (D,
Maine), who was preparing for his expected presidential campaign of 1972
(Ingram 1979). Muskie was chairman of the Air and Water Subcommittee
of the Senate Public Works Committee, and thus had a major role in
drafting the original version of the 1972 amendments. Muskie had been
stung by accusations from Ralph Nader's organization that he was weak
on water-quality policy. He responded by promoting a bill embodying
the regulatory approach with strong effluent standards. The full Senate
Public Works Committee unanimously (16-0) reported the Muskie bill
without questioning the regulatory approach or the likely economic
consequences. The Senate passed the bill unanimously (86-0) five days
later, essentially unchanged.
The Senate's biggest concern appeared to be the expenditures thePolitical Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 241
federal government ultimately might incur. The committee supplemental
report (filed by five Republicans) and two of the three floor roll-call
votes concerned provisions in the bill providing federal grants to local
governments for constructing water-treatment facilities. (The other vote
was on a proposal to allow the Small Business Administration to establish
a subsidized loan program for small businesses finding it hard to raise
necessary capital to install pollution-control devices.) The only alternative
to the regulatory scheme was a proposal from Senator William Proxmire
(D, Wisconsin) to include an effluent-tax system. This proposal was
debated briefly and then rejected on a voice vote.
In the House of Representatives, the Public Works Committee con-
sidered the bill in early 1972 and reported its version in March 1972. There
were several marked differences between the Senate and the House
Committee versions. The most important was that the House would
establish as goals rather than as mandatory the zero discharge standard
for 1985 and the BAT requirement for 1981 (later amended in conference to
1983). The House version also required a study by the National Academy
of Sciences on the environmental, technological, economic, and social
feasibility of meeting the 1981 and 1985 goals prior to the mandating of
their implementation.
6 Thus, the House Public Works Committee ex-
pressed concern over the uncertainty of economic impacts and sought to
delay implementation until further study. However, it did not question
the regulatory approach or the ultimate objectives. In dissenting reports,
Democrats Bella Abzug and Charles Rangel of New York supported a
set of modifications, known as the Reuss-Dingell Clean Water Package,
and proposed several amendments of their own. These proposals would
have reinstituted the Senate language mandating the 1981 and 1985
policies and added other strengthening requirements. A minority report
filed by Republicans Roger Zion (Indiana) and John Terry (New York)
expressed concern about the long-run economic impacts of the regulations
and requested more information on potential price increases, employ-
ment impacts, balance-of-trade effects, and budget commitments. They
did not propose any specific alterations to the committee version, however.
House floor debate focused largely on the stronger Reuss-Dingell amend-
ments, which were defeated, and the municipal-treatment grant program.
The final version, passed by the House on a 380-14 vote, was very close to
the version reported by the House committee. The final version of the bill,
as reported by the conference committee and passed over President
Richard M. Nixon's veto, kept the EDOP goals, but mandated
implementation of BAT standards in 1983.Leone and Jackson 242
What role did potential costs and economic impacts play in the passage
of these 1972 amendments? There was, of course, the expected conflict
between industry, labor, and environmentalist groups over the proposed
regulations. Presumably those individuals who would bear a small
proportion of the costs and who value environmental quality would be
more likely to support the legislation and to expect their representatives
to do likewise. Beyond that, our model suggests that some firms and
regions will be more disadvantaged than others; some may end up better
off, depending upon their location on the compliance-cost curve in
figure 5.1. We would then expect to find differences in positions taken
by different firms in their testimony before congressional committees,
in the behavior of various representatives, in industry and regional
presentations and comments to the regulatory agency, and in firms'
participation in lawsuits filed over the promulgated regulations, de-
pending upon relative economic impacts. Our concern is how influential
these various political activities may be in policy processes.
Perhaps the most conspicuous arena for these political considerations
is the House of Representatives, which is organized on a regional basis
and comprises legislators closely tied to district concerns. It would be
surprising if the expected or most obviously perceived distributional
impacts of proposed policies were not influential in the congressional
decision process. Thus, by examining regional distributions of costs and
benefits one ought to be able to explain, at least in part, the behavior of
the House in establishing the regulatory policy.
We have already commented that total costs of the 1972 Water Pollution
Control Amendments apparently were not considered in the development
and passage of the legislation. However, some of the direct cost and
employment effects were sufficiently large and concentrated to have
influenced congressional decisions. Other things being equal, such as
local pressures for environmental programs, it would be expected that
representatives from districts with large concentrations of potentially
impacted businesses would be more likely to oppose stronger versions
of the bill than representatives from districts likely to suffer little adverse
economic impact.
The amendments offered and voted on in the House of Representatives
provide an opportunity to examine how these direct regional consequences
influenced the legislation. Table 5.1 shows the six (of nine) recorded floor
votes taken in the House, which we will analyze.
7 The amendments are
ordered in terms of increasing regulatory strength, and presumably in
severity of impacts on industry. For example, passage of the Abzug andPolitical Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 243
Table 5.1 House votes on the 1972 Water Pollution Control Amendments.
Location of Amendment
Included in Analysis Relative to Vote for Passage
a
Passage of the bill. Passed 380-14. 0.00
McDonald (R, Michigan). Amendment to exempt
industries from paying capital costs on federally funded
municipal waste treatment plants which they use, in
addition to paying user charges for maintenance,
operation, and expansion. Rejected 66-337. A Nay 0.56
vote was considered to be in support of the act. (0.12)
W. Ford (D, Michigan). Amendment to guarantee
public hearings in EPA investigations of employee
firings or layoffs resulting from effluent limitations or 1.52
orders under the act. Adopted 275-117. (0.15)
Reuss (D, Wisconsin). Amendment to require adoption
of toxic-pollutant standards and effluent limitations
before EPA could transfer permit programs over to
the states, and to give EPA permit-by-permit veto
power over state programs; amendment would also
have eliminated a provision in the bill giving immunity
until 1976 to polluters who applied for discharge 2.72
permits. Rejected 154-251. (0.17)
Reuss (D, Wisconsin). Amendment to require industries
to use the "best available" water pollution control 3.04
technology by 1981. Rejected 140-249. (0.17)
Abzug (D, New York). Amendment to require impact
statements under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 for all activities covered by the bill. 3.50
Rejected 125-268. (0.18)
a. For an explanation of the entries in this column see the discussion in the text.
Reuss amendments would have produced a much stronger bill with more
severe impacts on manufacturing firms. Conversely, the McDonald
amendment was designed to limit impacts on firms by exempting them
from capital costs of new municipal waste-treatment plants.
We have categorized legislators who voted according to which amend-
ments they supported or opposed to obtain a measure of support for the
legislation. For example, someone voting against all amendments and
the bill itself was placed in the first category, while someone who just
voted for the bill is put in the second category, and so on. Representatives
who voted for all amendments fall into the seventh, or highest, category.
8
The distribution of representatives by respective categories is given in
table 5.2. Fifteen representatives did not cast enough votes to be located
on the scale and are omitted from further analysis. The scale has a fairly
broad distribution, with only some bunching at the upper end. Thus,Leone and Jackson 244















a. In most instances, the number of categories is equivalent to the number of votes a repre-
sentative cast for pollution control. A representative who cast a vote for a more stringent
amendment, but against a less stringent one, was assigned to a category that would maximize
the coefficient of reproducibility.
Table 5.3 Model of House voting on the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments.
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a. These coefficients and the coefficients reported in table 5.1 were estimated using n-
chotomous multivariate probit techniques.
b. Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Oklahoma.
c. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas.
d. Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota.
e. Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas.
f. Montana, Idaho, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Wyoming.
g. Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, California, Hawaii.
h. The primary metals, mining and petroleum extraction variables are dummy variables
equal to 1 if the industry is important to the district's economy (as reported by the Almanac
of American Politics). Paper production is tons of capacity from Lockwood's Directory of
the Pulp and Paper Industry. The cost/ton data are derived from Leone et al. 1975.Political Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 245
it should provide a good measure of the positions of most legislators on
the issue of water-pollution-control regulations.
The next step is to relate these positions to demands for environmental
quality and to the economic impacts in each district. We focus on the
pulp and paper industry, and we want to know specifically if the likelihood
of a representative's supporting strong environmental legislation decreases
if there are pulp or paper mills in the district, and if this support is further
reduced if likely compliance costs for district mills would increase.
The model and the statistical method used to explain House voting
on the 1972 amendments are described elsewhere (Jackson and Leone
1978), but we can easily summarize its contents and results. The major
determinants of a representative's position on the legislation are hypothe-
sized to be the district's demand for environmental cleanup, the likely
economic consequences for the district, and the representative's party
affiliation and personal preferences. The precise variables used in the
analysis, their estimated effects on legislators' positions, and the standard
errors of the coefficients are shown in table 5.3.
9
The statistical method provides an estimate of relative location, or
spacing, of votes used to constitute our scale of support for stronger
water pollution regulation. The numbers in table 5.1 are these estimated
locations, with the vote for passage arbitrarily defined as zero to locate
the scale. (The parenthetical numbers are standard errors of estimated
locations.) The three amendments in the Clean Water Package are located
close together, while the largest distances are between these amendments
and the Ford amendment, and between the Ford amendment and the
two weakest votes. The magnitudes of distances between votes aid in
interpreting coefficients in the underlying model. For example, it would
take a difference of at least 1.2 in estimated positions of two representatives
to bridge the gap between the Ford amendment and the first Reuss
amendment.
The specification of demand variables is based on a model of people's
willingness to pay (in dollars) for environmental cleanup, as estimated
with data from a 1969 Harris survey (Jackson 1979). This model shows
that willingness to pay is strongly related to a person's region and place
of residence, age, family size, education, and income.
1
0 Unfortunately,
data on income and education levels of congressional-district residents
is not available for 1972.
1
1 We hope that inclusion of housing-stock
variables serves as a proxy for these characteristics. The population-
density variable is included to represent estimated willingness-to-pay
differences between rural and metropolitan areas. Coefficients on theseLeone and Jackson 246
variables are consistent with the demand model. Only a district's median
voter age did not perform as expected. This may be explained by the
small variation in this variable and by the fact that what variation exists
is largely attributable to the location of large military bases, with their
younger nonresident populations. We thus conclude that representatives'
positions were related to the environmental demands of their constituents.
The party-affiliation variables are self-explanatory. Northern Demo-
crats exhibited much stronger support for the legislation than did Re-
publicans, with the support of southern Democrats somewhere in between.
The results are consistent with the pressure President Nixon put on the
House to weaken the bill. The age of legislators is used to proxy their
own preferences, and this has the expected sign: Younger representatives
show preferences for more stringent regulations.
In addition to economic impacts associated with the pulp and paper
industry, we make a crude attempt to include the presence in districts of
other industries likely to be adversely affected by the regulations. The
Almanac of American Politics (Barone et al. 1972) gives a brief summary
of the industrical base of each district, compiled from the 1970 census.
The variables, primary metal, mining, and petroleum extraction, are
simply dummy variables based on whether the almanac mentioned the
appropriate economic activity. As such, they may not be completely
reliable, particularly for metropolitan areas where census data are not
available on a congressional-district level. The authors of the almanac
admitted that for these districts the description is based largely on
characteristics of the entire metropolitan area. This difficulty may help
explain the wrong sign on the primary metal variable, since many steel
mills are located in metropolitan areas. It may also be the case that
water quality is lower in such districts and the legislator was voting for
cleanup in spite of economic effects.
Local compliance costs for the pulp and paper industry are our par-
ticular concern here. The importance of this industry to a district is
measured by production capacity in thousands of tons per day of mills
in the district. Cost data, in dollars per ton to meet 1983 BAT standards,
are from the National Commission on Water Quality (NCWQ) study.
The NCWQ model used for estimating these costs is the predecessor to
the industry model described elsewhere in this paper. Our hypothesis is
that the greater the estimated cost of complying with the 1983 standards,
the greater the adverse economic impact on a district—in terms of both
personal income and employment—and the less likely a representative
was to support stronger versions of the 1972 amendments.
1
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There are two alternative hypotheses about the expected signs on the
two pulp and paper variables. A naive hypothesis is that paper companies
(and, presumably, representatives from districts with economies based
on pulp and paper) are sensitive to any regulation that may raise their
costs and reduce output and profits. Particularly, given uncertainty about
how regulations might be written and enforced, firms may simply be
wary of the unknown and oppose any government regulation. If this is
the case, we would expect congressional voting to be sensitive to the
amount of pulp and paper production in a district, but relatively insensitive
to costs, which were only determined after the EPA began to define
industry categories and establish effluent standards. The hypothesis based
on more sophisticated behavior is that firms are aware not just of their
own expected pollution-control costs, but how these costs compare with
those of competing firms. With this knowledge, firms estimate their
expected change in net worth, not just cost increases. This calculation is
based on the shape of the compliance-cost curve of figure 5.1. According to
this analysis, firms in the left-hand portion of the curve potentially stand to
have increases in net worth because expected price increases resulting
from a shift in the aggregate supply curve may exceed their compliance
costs, resulting in increased profit margins. Sophisticated firms in the
left portion of the curve may actually gain economically from imposition
of pollution standards and might be expected to support the legislation.
A large negative coefficient on the cost multiplied by the production
variable and a positive (or at least a zero) coefficient on the production
variable would support this hypothesis.
The estimates do not support the more sophisticated model of firm
behavior, but indicate that representatives from districts with pulp and
paper mills were less likely to support the legislation. Although the
standard error of each coefficient is large, the null hypothesis that pulp
and paper presence and costs have no effect (that is, that both coefficients
equal zero) can be rejected at the 0.01 level. The x
2 value for this hy-
pothesis is 10.0 with 2 degrees of freedom. (If the production capacity
multiplied by cost per ton variable is deleted, the coefficient of production
capacity is —0.20, with a standard error of 0.06.)
Overall, voting was not sensitive to estimated compliance costs. For
a district with the maximum capacity (6,500 tons per day), the predicted
effect on congressional voting of a $10 per ton cost difference (the
maximum difference among districts) is only — 0.20.
1
3 For smaller cost
differences or for districts with less capacity, expected voting differences
will be even smaller.Leone and Jackson 248
In contrast, the mere presence within a district of 6,500 tons of daily
pulp and paper production capacity at the average compliance cost of
$6 per ton affects a representative's vote by —1.30.
1
4 Each 1,000-ton
decrease in capacity increases the expected support for pollution-control
regulations by 0.20 at the average compliance cost of $6 per ton. The
significance of these magnitudes can be ascertained by consulting table
5.1 for differences in locations of votes.
We conclude from these results that congressional voting on the 1972
amendments was sensitive to potential direct economic effects on a
district, but in a rather unsophisticated manner. Representatives did not
seem to be pressing a possible economic advantage to their region by
supporting legislation that would give local mills a competitive advantage;
they simply opposed regulations affecting local industry.
An obvious rationale for the relative unimportance of variations in
compliance costs in explaining congressional voting is that intraindustry
impacts were not known at the time the legislation was considered. The
development of a regulatory policy is largely defined by the stream of
administrative decisions made by the regulatory agency once the legisla-
tion is passed. In the case of the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, the bill simply specified that industry had to satisfy effluent
standards consistent with the BPT by 1977 and the BAT by 1983 for
given industries and industry subcategories. It was left to EPA to define
the subcategories, to specify what constituted BPT and BAT standards
for various industries and subcategories, and to establish the norms. Only
when the EPA begins this process are firms able to predict how they will
be affected. Without these predictions, one might expect a strong, general
opposition to the concept of being regulated (possibly in anticipation of
adverse economic consequences), with no variation in opposition in
response to variations in economic impacts.
Administrative Rulemaking and Regulatory Impacts
The fact that distributional consequences within an industry (and thus
between regions) are not defined until rulemaking regulatory processes
begin has strong implications for the effect of distributional impacts on
policy processes. The regulating agency (in this case the EPA) determines
these impacts, which implies that the agency and not the Congress becomes
the focus for the political forces they generate. The question now to be
asked is: How, and to what extent, are an administrative or regulatory
agency's rulemaking and enforcing decisions affected by pressures relatedPolitical Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 249
to the economic consequences of their decisions? A brief glimpse at this
process, and at possible influences of economic effects, is obtained by
noting that the EPA published three different versions of BPT and BAT
standards for a large section of the pulp and paper industry. These
different versions and solicitation of industry and public comments are
part of the required rulemaking procedure. Subsequent alterations of
the standards and industry categorizations provide clear evidence of
accommodation to various pressures from segments of the industry and
from environmentalists.
Investigation of the question posed in the preceding paragraph and
analysis of different standards proposed by the EPA require that we
estimate for a segment of the pulp and paper industry the detailed model
described in the first section of this paper. This is done for the tissue
portion of the industry.
In estimating impacts of regulations, first it is necessary to identify
the distribution of costs the tissue industry will confront in meeting the
regulations. That is, we must estimate the compliance-cost curve (figure
5.1). Second, these costs must be translated into price effects and microlevel
impacts. The specific procedures used to calculate the costs the tissue
industry will incur in complying with mandated water-pollution reduc-
tions and associated total costs of manufacture are described elsewhere
(Leone 1980). Here, we merely note that these costs are estimated on a
plant-by-plant basis. This is done by taking cost levels estimated for
"representative" or hypothetical mills and regressing them on various
mill characteristics. The resulting equations permitted estimation of costs
for sixty-four existing mills in the industry.
1
5
In calculating pollution-control costs, we assume that each plant will
minimize the discounted present value (with an interest rate of 15 percent)
of compliance costs for the anticipated sequence of 1977, 1983 and 1985
standards, and that all in-process or end-of-pipe changes that reduce
pollution loads and yield a 15 percent return will be made. Occasionally,
this assumption may not be valid. For example, the 1985 standards are
merely a "goal" in the 1972 act. If they are not enforced, then on a present-
value basis a company may take a different course of action to meet the
1983 standards. Furthermore, we ignore issues of regulatory uncertainly;
that is, we assume that standards are known and will be strictly enforced.
The principal benefit of this microlevel cost orientation is that it permits
simulating the distributional consequences of regulation which we argued
are so important to understanding the political economics of business
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Figure 5.5 Estimated 1977 BPT compliance-cost curve (economic-cost basis).
The estimated compliance-cost curve for the tissue portion of the pulp
and paper industry for 1977 BPT effluent control levels is shown in figure
5.5. The BPT costs range from $1.85 to $82.82 per ton.
1
6 About 80 percent
of capacity has unit costs of $12.34 per ton or less. The average economic
cost for the tissue industry is $9.41 per ton.
Figure 5.6 is identical in construction to figure 5.5, but shows various
definitions of total manufacturing costs estimated in 1974 prices.
1
7 The
middle curve reports total costs of production on an accounting cost
basis before the act; thus, it excludes all water-pollution-control costs
associated with the act except those with a rate of return of 15 percent
on the required investment. The range of production costs is substantial:
from $556 to $693 per ton. The weighted average cost of $613 per ton
is exceeded by thirty-five of the sixty-four mills in our sample, which
indicates that the lower-cost mills are predominantly the larger ones.
Although it cannot directly be discerned by comparing figures 5.5 and
5.6, it is worth noting that there is no obvious correlation between a
mill's BPT compliance costs and its total manufacturing costs. It is not
the case, for example, that mills with high production costs necessarily
have high BPT compliance costs. Accordingly, to understand the eco-
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Figure 5.6 Various definitions of total cost of production for the tissue industry. Solid
line: economic-cost basis, BAT. Dash-dot line: accounting-cost basis, before the act.
Dotted line: variable-cost basis, before the act.
the distribution of BPT costs alone; it also is necessary to examine the
underlying distribution of manufacturing costs.
Because the accounting cost numbers in figure 5.6 represent total costs,
they are not relevant to short-run decisionmaking. Thus, we also report
in figure 5.6 our estimates of the variable costs of production without
effluent controls. These figures reflect costs observed in the second
quarter of 1974. At that time, the capacity-utilization rate in the tissue
industry was approximately 94 percent and a typical price for tissue was
$638 per ton (Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1974). In view of the extensive
possibilities for error in our cost-estimation procedures, these observed
price and utilization levels are quite consistent with the numbers shown
in figure 5.6. Indeed, at a 94 percent utilization rate, figure 5.6 implies
a price of $627 per ton; at a price of $638, figure 5.6 forecasts a utilization
rate of 97 percent. These predictions are very close to the observed values.Leone and Jackson 252
Table 5.4 The tissue industry's costs of production with BPT controls in place (1974 prices,


































































































































































































































































































































































Deviations may be attributed to two phenomena. First, most assuredly,
is the rudimentary nature of our costing procedures. Second, we incor-
porated all profitable internal and external process changes into the costs
shown in figure 5.6. In practice, not all mills in 1974 had yet adopted
these cost-saving measures; furthermore, the fact that savings manifest
themselves principally in lower variable costs partially explains our
understatement of price at the observed utilization rate.
1
8
Total manufacturing costs in 1977 with BPT pollution controls in
place are shown in table 5.4, which shows the same kind of information
presented graphically in preceding figures. The second column shows the
percentile ranking of each mill after BPT controls; the rightmost column
shows the same ranking without controls. A comparison of these two
columns indicates some interesting competitive consequences of BPT
regulations. For example, without controls mill 25 ranks at the 43rd
percentile of industry costs; with BPT controls it ranks at the 90th
percentile. The economic circumstances of mill 25 are almost surely
politically sensitive, given its dramatic shift in relative competitive position
after imposition of BPT effluent controls.
For most mills, relative shifts in competitive advantage are far less
dramatic than the shift experienced by mill 25. For example, twenty-sixLeone and Jackson 254
mills are relatively worse off after BPT controls; that is, they have per-
centile rankings higher after BPT than before. Only fifteen of these mills
have shifts of two percentile points or more. However, the largest shifts
occur at the high-cost end of the spectrum, precisely where they are most
important from the standpoint of economic survival. Note, for example,
that in addition to mill 25, mills 28, 17, 14, 35, and 24 all have relatively
major shifts at the high-cost end of the spectrum.
Seventeen mills have improvements in their relative total-cost position
after BPT; eleven of these shift by two or more points. Thus, overall,
forty-three of sixty-four mills in our sample experience a relative shift
in competitive advantage that is due to BPT effluent controls.
These relative cost shifts have two distinguishable, but related, impacts
on the economics of an individual plant. The first effect is obvious: The
higher a plant's relative costs, the lower any quasirents it might earn.
Thus, relative cost shifts due to regulations create and dissipate quasirents
earned by producers. There is a second impact, however, which is
distinguishable from the first. The lower a plant's percentile cost ranking,
the less vulnerable it is to changes in an industry's overall economic
conditions. Thus, a plant that shifts to a lower ranking because of regu-
lation may be able to sustain a higher rate of capacity utilization than
its disadvantaged competitors.
1
9 In sum, a favorable shift in the cost
ranking of an individual plant both increases the plant's margins and
reduces the likelihood that its full capacity will be underutilized.
Alternative abatement standards imply different mill costs and quasi-
rent distributions. The EPA's water-pollution-control effort in moving
from BPT to BAT and then to EDOP can create or destroy competitive
advantages. We suggest that one dimension of competitive advantage is
a plant's costs relative to its competition. These shifts in competitive
advantage are summarized in table 5.5 for tissue producers at mandated
water-pollution-abatement levels. If nothing else, this table quickly
demonstrates the likely complexity of political forces set in motion by
water-pollution controls. As noted earlier, of sixty-four mills in our
sample, seventeen are in a relatively better cost position after BPT
standards are in place. For only two or three of these mills is the improve-
ment at all substantial. In contrast, twenty-six mills experience a relative
loss of competitive advantage. For about half a dozen, the deterioration
is substantial. In other words, gains and losses are not symmetrical in
absolute magnitude. Primarily, this is because some very small facilities
experience significant deterioration in their relative positions, but, being
small in aggregate, their losses do not result in large gains for other mills.Political Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 255




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: These are total accounting costs except the right most column, which reflects replace-
ment costs on an economic basis.
Given that BPT standards are in place, a move to BAT standards
yields very few changes in relative competitive position. Indeed, only
five mills experience an absolute change of ranking of three or more
percentile points. Thus, it appears that BAT standards principally affect
the height but not the shape of the industry's effluent-control-cost curve.
Under such circumstances, it would be expected that the industry would
be able to sustain a fairly unified political position against BAT standards.
EDOP standards, however, produce relatively large shifts in competitive
advantage within the industry.
Whenever the politics of pollution controls are discussed, the issue
of plant closings invariably receives a great deal of attention. Our analysis
yields some interesting insights on the closure question.
On an economic basis, management will choose to close a facility
rather than invest in pollution-abatement equipment if it cannot expect
to earn an adequate return on its pollution-control expenditures. Thus,
if the anticipated product price is less than the sum of variable costs of
manufacturing plus economic costs of pollution control, a facility will be
closed. Examined in this way, the estimated price increase due to BAT
controls is about $4 per ton. Alternatively, if it is believed that investors
cannot make perfect decisions and precisely estimate the desired level
of industry capital stock, the price for tissue can be determined after
firms have complied with BAT standards by examining variable costsPolitical Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 257
of production with BAT standards in place.
2
0 At a 94 percent capacity
utilization rate, variable costs with BAT are $3 higher than variable
costs without effluent controls. The discrepancy of $1 per ton from the
two different methods is well within our estimate of error. Since $3 or
$4 would constitute a price increase of less than 0.5 percent and since




If producers correctly forecast a $3 price increase and make their
pollution-control-compliance decisions on that basis, five of the sixty-four
facilities in our sample will close. (These five represent less than 4 percent
of total capacity; hence, their closing would not influence our estimate
of the BAT price.)
Of these five closure candidates, only one was among the fifteen
highest-cost facilities when measured on the basis of unit costs of abate-
ment. In other words, the cost of regulatory compliance is a poor predictor
of plant closings. Indeed, three of the five closure candidates had BAT
costs less than the industry average, and two of these had costs less than
half the industry average.
In contrast, all five closure candidates were among the top ten most
costly plants when ranked on a variable-cost basis. It would be "correct"
to conclude—as most closure impact studies do—that these facilities
would have closed anyway, since they are the highest-cost facilities in
the industry. Furthermore, they represent less than five percent of industry
capacity and thus could reasonably be expected to constitute the 5-6
percent of capacity one would expect to retire in any given year or two
simply by the process of normal economic depreciation. However, their
demise is clearly accelerated by pollution-control regulations (how much
is difficult to say in the absence of a dynamic model of industry investment).
If it is assumed that these plants close two years earlier than they would
have otherwise, the capital losses associated with plant closings can be
calculated. Variable costs per ton prior to pollution controls for our
closure candidates are reported in table 5.6. Note that four of the five
already had average variable costs that exceeded the preabatement price
of $638 per ton. Thus, they were already operating, if at all, on the
thinnest of margins. Indeed, in the aggregate these five facilities would
need to forgo a $5 per ton contribution (price minus variable cost) on
their entire output (which is highly unlikely) for the capital loss (present
value at 10 percent) due to pollution controls to equal $1 million.
This analysis merely illustrates that important capital losses due to
pollution controls are not found in the closing plants. Consider mill 3.Leone and Jackson 258
Table 5.6 Variable costs per ton (1974 prices)








It will not close because of pollution controls. However, prior to imposi-
tion of controls it had total costs of $625 per ton, and thus was earning
an accounting profit of $13 per ton. Mill 3 has a capacity of 45 tons per
day; it is a high-cost mill, with a life expectancy of, say, ten years. With
BAT controls, its revenue rises by $3 per ton; however, its economic
costs of BAT compliance rise by about $8 (they are relatively high because
capital must be recovered in 10 years). Thus, its profit rate drops to $8
per ton—a loss of $5 per ton. The capitalized value of this $5 per ton
loss for ten years at fifteen percent is about $400,000.
In fact, only two mills, representing less than 2 percent of industry
capacity, have economic costs of BAT compliance that are less than the
$3 per ton price increase. Recall from table 5.5 that BAT raises the
curve in figure 5.4 for all firms but does not alter the ranking significantly.
Thus, the remaining fifty-seven mills which can economically justify
compliance do so only by taking a reduction in the economic returns
they were earning prior to pollution controls. The capital losses associated
with all these changes in rents swamp the capital losses due to plant
closures; the potential capital loss for mill 1 alone is $13 million.
An aggregate industry estimate of potential capital losses associated
with dissipated quasirents can be calculated as follows: The average
economic cost per ton with BAT (after plant closures) is $11.82; the
added revenue is $3. The capitalized value of the resulting $8.82-per-ton
loss for ten years at 15 percent is $130 million. Thus, effluent-control
regulations have the potential of dissipating large quasirents. These losses
do not affect the marginal decisions of managers of existing facilities,
but they certainly do influence the overall profitability of this industry.
The political entanglements created by these potential losses raise
intriguing questions of public policy. In effect, our analysis suggests that
a major economic consequence of water-pollution controls may be better
measured by the resulting redistribution of wealth than by the price and
quantity effects that receive so much attention.Political Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 259
These capital losses have been described as "potential" because thus
far we have ignored any dynamic consequences of effluent controls. We
now turn to issues of economics of new mills so as better to understand
these dynamic impacts and the long-run price and profit effects. Figure
5.6 reported the total economic costs of replacing existing facilities in
the tissue industry, assuming that these mills comply with BAT standards.
A similar calculation of replacement costs prior to controls shows virtually
no change in the rankings of the lowest-cost mills. Thus, BAT regulations
do not seriously affect the overall geographic and technological thrust
of the tissue industry. However, BAT controls do add $10-15 per ton
to the price required to justify investment in this industry—approximately
a 2 percent increase in total costs.
This seemingly small change actually is quite important to the dynamic
performance of the tissue industry. New mills are high-cost producers;
thus, this added 2 percent would not merely dissipate a quasirent that
otherwise would have been earned by new producers, but would influence
the marginal economics of this industry. By influencing marginal eco-
nomics, it would significantly impact the quasirents of existing producers
—indeed, it would likely raise their quasirents in the long run by the total
$10-$15-per-ton economic-cost differential. In other words, because new
facilities are high-cost, existing producers would recoup the quasirents
they appear to have lost in our earlier comparative static analysis.
Compare the situation in the tissue industry in 1974 (before controls)
with that in 1984 (post-BAT). Presumably, in this period 20-25 percent
of existing capacity would have been retired owing to physical deprecia-
tion. The marginal producers, therefore, would all have new facilities.
This would necessitate a return on the margin of total economic costs,
and hence prices would be set on this basis. As shown in figure 5.3, all
existing capacity would have to operate at virtually 100 percent utilization
for this to occur. In these circumstances prices would have to be at least
$679 per ton, the break-even cost of the lowest-cost source of new capacity
shown in figure 5.6. Of course, new facilities would also have high cost
in the absence of controls.
Thus, our scenario is the same for 1984 without controls, except that
the break-even price is only $669 per ton—the lowest cost source of
new capacity in the absence of controls. Consequently, the long-run
effects of BAT controls do not make the industry any more or less
sensitive to the business cycle, because the marginal producers are the
new producers in either case. However, BAT controls would create a
$10 price umbrella over the rest of the industry, wiping out their potentialLeone and Jackson 260
losses in quasirents due to controls and extending the economic life of
old plants. Thus, viewed in long-run perspective, BAT controls are likely
to reduce plant closures and increase profits for existing producers. The
higher prices dictated by this process contract the overall size of the
industry, but this manifests itself in fewer new plants rather than in lower
profits for the existing ones.
Fewer new plants implies lost economic opportunities for regions that
would have housed new plants and gains for regions that find their old
plants more profitable. Since the price elasticity of demand is low and
the price increases due to controls are small, the impact of pollution
controls on total capacity need not be very great; the total capacity of
the tissue industry declines only 0.5 percent. The second effect is quite
substantial, however; the price umbrella of $10 per ton significantly
increases profits of existing plants. The existence of quasirents may
justify some life-extending investments. Increases in quasirents due to
BAT controls would create still greater incentives for such investments.
The preceding discussion illustrates the complexities of analyzing the
political economy of business regulation. Three methodological con-
clusions emerge. First, to determine the impacts of costs associated with
regulatory policies, it is essential to understand the nature of the under-
lying costs of production upon which they will be superimposed. High
costs of compliance cannot simply be equated with negative economic
impacts. Second, we observed that regulations can create and dissipate
quasirents of important magnitudes, but to appreciate the true impacts
of shifts in competitive advantage it is essential to consider costs of
production associated with marginal sources of capacity in an industry.
Third, any final assessment of net impacts on industry of alterations
in quasirents requires a careful analysis of the timing of these changes.
We have suggested that losses in early years are likely to be offset by gains
in later years; whether the net result is capital losses or capital gains to
individual competitors depends critically on time streams of cost and
price increases.
Regulations create and dissipate quasirents, which undoubtedly
accounts for much of the political maneuvering of economic actors faced
with regulation. We examine this hypothesis by analyzing various stand-
ards proposed by the EPA. When the EPA established compliance require-
ments for 1977, it did so in three steps. In 1975 the agency proposed a
set of standards. The industry commented on these, and the EPA sub-
sequently revised them in 1976. These standards were again revised beforePolitical Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 261




























































a. Raw loads are based on representative mills.
b. Biological oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS) are two important
measures of water pollution in the tissue industry.
they became final in 1977. Changes for three typical subcategories of the
tissue industry are reported in table 5.7.
Note that the standards were not always made less stringent in
subsequent rounds. In two of these subcategories, standards for total
suspended solids (TSS) were more stringent in 1977 than those proposed
in 1976. For the most part, however, these tighter standards were not
more costly; that is, the relationship between waste treatment and cost
is not a monotonic continuous function. With a given removal method,
it may be possible to raise standards without raising costs. For example,
primary waste treatment might effectively remove 30 percent of all bio-
logical oxygen demand in a plant's waste stream. A standard that requires
25 percent removal has no higher cost than one that requires 20 percent
removal under these circumstances.
The net effect of EPA's three efforts was to relax standards and lower
the overall height of the compliance-cost curve. However, it is necessary
to consider the shape of the compliance-cost curve as well as its height,
for it is alterations in shape that determine changes in quasirents due to
pollution controls. The flatter the compliance-cost curve, the smaller the
additional rents.
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that the EPA, as a political agency,
seeks to flatten the compliance-cost curve and thus avoid creating or
dissipating substantial competitive advantages as a result of its pollution-
control activities. Indeed, in conversation with a representative of a pulp
and paper industry trade association, we were told that the lobbying
objective of that association was to "flatten our curve."
It is difficult to test the hypothesis that the EPA tries to flatten the
curve, because of the nature of effluent-control technology and theLeone and Jackson 262




















































available data. As a rule of thumb, a particular treatment system is
thought to remove a given percentage of raw waste; for example, primary
treatment typically removes 30 percent of the raw-load biological oxygen
demand (BOD). Though we have no information on actual raw loads for
individual plants, we have been advised to assume that loads are constant
among plants using similar technology.
2
2 With such an assumption, a
given change in standard is a constant percentage change in required
treatment for all competitors and shifts the compliance-cost curve a
constant percentage distance at all points. This necessarily flattens the
curve. However, tissue manufacturers fall into several subcategories, so
the EPA can further alter the shape of the compliance-cost curve for this
industry as a whole by differentially changing standards for each sub-
category. This strategy would produce the flattening we predict with our
"equal pain" hypothesis; however, this flattening, if observed, would not
be a consequence of the way the data are constructed.
Percentage changes in compliance costs associated with the subsequent
rounds of effluent standards for tissue manufacturers in three sub-
categories are shown in table 5.8. Note that the subcategory with the
lowest average cost (nonintegrated tissue) experienced the greatest re-
duction in costs with subsequent versions of the BPT standards. However,
this category's low average cost masks its very high maximum cost.
Bleached kraft, with the lowest maximum compliance cost, experienced
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Figure 5.7 Estimated compliance-cost curves for three versions of 1977 BPT standards.
Solid line: 1975 version. Dashed line: 1976-1977 versions (the two curves are virtually
indistinguishable).
Within each subcategory, the low-cost tissue producers experienced
the greatest percentage but lowest absolute cost reductions. Thus,
flattening of the MCC curve is observed because higher-cost producers
receive the largest absolute decreases in costs.
Cost-versus-capacity results for tissue manufacturers are shown in
figure 5.7. Between 1975 and 1976 (the two rounds that matter most)
the low-cost plants experienced an $0.11-per-ton reduction in costs,
versus $5.93 per ton for the high-cost mills. The average dropped by
$0.23 per ton. In interpreting the impacts of these cost reductions, it is
important to note that rents earned are determined by two components:
a producer's own costs and those of the industry's marginal producers.
For comparison with the earlier discussion, assume that this industry
operates at 94 percent of capacity. The absolute decrease in costs at the
relevant margin due to the less stringent 1976 standard is between $0.20
and $0.50 per ton, as determined by the shift in total production costs
that results from the shift in compliance costs shown in figure 5.7.
Because this is the relevant margin for determining prices, we predict a
price drop of that magnitude. Our low-cost producer has a cost savings
of about $0.11 per ton with the less stringent standards, while high-cost
producers save up to $6.00 per ton; the average decrease is $0.23 per ton.Leone and Jackson 264
Table 5.9 Differences in cost and waste loads associated with standards announced in 1975
versus those announced in 1977.
Change in Average Change in Pollution
Subcategory Cost per Ton (Pounds per Ton) Cost per Pound
a
Bleached kraft -$0.08 +1.2
b $0,067
Deinking mills - 0.30 +4.9
b 0.065
Nonintegrated - 0.49 +3.3
C 0.148
a. Without knowing how the EPA "trades off" BOD versus TSS, we cannot compare
the numbers for nonintegrated mills with those for the other subcategories.
b. For this subcategory, the binding constraint is the BOD standard; lower costs yield
higher levels of BOD in the subcategory's effluent.
c. For this subcategory, the binding constraint is the suspended-solids standard; lower
costs yield higher levels of TSS in the subcategory's effluent.
Thus, the EPA appears to have reduced the average cost of pollution
abatement and the price of tissue to consumers by roughly comparable
amounts. Furthermore, it appears that the reduction in standards yields
distributional impacts consistent with the equal-pain principle. Low-cost
producers receive cost decreases less than the price decrease ($0.11 per ton
versus $0.20-$0.50 per ton); high-cost producers' cost decreases exceed
the price decrease ($5.93 per ton versus $0.20-$0.50 per ton). For the
average producer, costs and prices decrease by comparable amounts.
One could argue, of course, that the distributional consequences of
the EPA's actions are incidental to its efforts to develop a rational
environmental policy. Indeed, a policy that maximized environmental
quality would equate cost—on the margin—across sources of pollution.
(Strictly, the equation should be between incremental benefits and in-
cremental costs. A proper assessment of this tradeoff would require
geographic and other details.)
Differences in cost and waste loads associated with changes in standards
can be observed in table 5.9. The evidence for the bleached kraft and
deinking subcategories suggests that the EPA values BOD, on the margin,
at about 6.5-6.7 cents per pound and that the leveling of the compliance-
cost curve may be a result of the EPA's efforts to achieve an efficient
environmental policy. Unfortunately for our purposes, the observed flat-
tening of the tissue industry's compliance-cost curve is largely the con-
sequence of changes in standards for nonintegrated producers. For these
facilities, however, TSS is the constraining pollutant, and the rates at
which the EPA "trades off" TSS for BOD are not known. Thus, we cannot
now conclude whether the observed flattening of the compliance-cost
curve is attributable to the EPA's response to an equity (equal pain) or an
efficiency (equal marginal cost) criterion.
2
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Evaluating Regulation as a Social-Policy Tool
The model developed earlier in this article and its application to
water-pollution controls in the pulp and paper industry provide several
important insights into the use of business regulation to achieve selected
public goals. These insights concern both how the effects of proposed
regulations are modeled and how effectively public institutions consider
these effects in formulating policy.
Perhaps the principal insight is that one must model industry on a
disaggregated basis and in a dynamic context in order to measure the
economic impacts of proposed regulations. This conclusion holds even
if one is interested only in aggregate costs of regulations. Shifts in industry
supply curves resulting from regulations are a function of the relationship
between marginal costs imposed on individual plants by regulations and
plants' existing cost structure. If the highest marginal control costs fall
predominantly on the lowest-cost producers, the shift in the aggregate
industry supply curve and the ultimate consumer burden will be relatively
small. If the highest marginal control costs are incurred by the otherwise
highest-cost producers, the resulting shift in the aggregate supply curve
and changes in market prices could be quite large. Given the heterogeneous
nature of the cost structures of firms in an industry, we conclude that
virtually the only way to obtain information on an industry's "relevant
margins" is with a highly disaggregated model such as the one developed
here for the tissue segment of the pulp and paper industry.
Our efforts also reveal that the model should be dynamic as well as
disaggregated. Many of the consequences of regulation surface as firms
try to adjust their capital stock and rationalize operations to the new,
regulated circumstances. These short-run costs are important both in
determining the total cost of imposing regulations and in affecting the
structure of the industry. For example, if short-run effects fall predomi-
nantly on small, marginal producers, the results might be the demise of
these marginal producers (regardless of whether they could have been
viable in the long run), large short-run price increases, and a more
oligopolistic industry. Use of aggregate, static models and sole reliance
on engineering-cost calculations of the capital and operating costs of
regulatory compliance will miss these important effects entirely.
The model also points out the sensitivity of overall economic impacts
to the administrative decisions of regulatory agencies. This is demon-
strated by our analysis of the EPA's development of regulations for the
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or definitions have large distributional impacts. The 1-3 percent reduction
in BPT standards proposed by the EPA in 1976 relative to those proposed
in 1975 constitutes a small reduction in overall pollution control. The
analysis also implies that the aggregate cost savings to consumers is small;
prices dropped by 0.03-0.07 percent ($0.20-$0.50 per ton on a base of
$638 per ton). However, the redistribution of potential profits among
firms is quite large.
From a policy-formation perspective it is important that administrative
decisions are made by regulatory agencies well after Congress has made
the decision to adopt a regulatory approach and legislated requirements
to set standards. Because of this "decoupling" of legislative and adminis-
trative processes, it is extremely difficult for information about economic
costs and their incidence to influence the initial decisions about the
regulatory process. We feel that, because of the difficulty of predicting
economic costs and the late timing of the decisions most relevant to
costs, the choice to proceed with regulations and the decisions about
their stringency are made without adequate attention to economic impacts.
The disincentives for adequate consideration of costs are compounded
by the largely private nature of production and pollution-control costs.
Most public activities require specific authorization and appropriation of
public funds. Particularly with the present budget process, Congress is
required explicitly to consider the costs of specific programs with respect
to those of other programs, increased taxes, or larger deficits. These same
procedures do not apply to most regulatory policies, however, because
most costs of these programs never appear in government budgets.
Dorfman (1975) estimated that in the long run only about 25 percent of
the total abatement costs of air and water pollution-control programs
passed in the early 1970s will be borne by the public sector. Since this
includes state and local funds as well as federal, we may presume that
Congress has passed legislation for which it must account for only a small
proportion of the abatement costs. In light of this "off the balance sheet"
financing and the absence of accountability, one may expect Congress to
grant easy passage to privately expensive programs, particularly if they
have attractive benefits.
Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis. Indeed, Congress was
clearly under pressure from the public and from environmental interest
groups "to do something about the environment" in 1972. We contend
that the difficulty in predicting or even observing regulatory costs and
the fact that many of these costs are not publicly funded help explain
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striking to note that virtually all the Senate deliberations and important
parts of the House debate concerned the size of the federally funded
municipal-waste-treatment grant program, although it made up only a
small fraction of total program costs. Although some representatives did
try to raise questions about potential impacts of the regulations, and
the House even considered a delay in mandating the 1985 and 1983
standards pending a National Academy of Sciences study on feasibility
and impacts, these cautions were rejected. We pose an obvious question:
If Congress were politically responsible for funding the full impact of its
water-pollution program, would the legislation have passed both houses
by so wide a margin?
A related difficulty concerns the timing of important decisions in the
regulatory process and its consequences for rational social policymaking.
We have already noted that the EPA's administrative decisions are
important determinants of overall policy. It would be expected that
potential impacts, such as those documented here, would influence both
the legislative and administrative development of regulatory policy.
Unfortunately, information on such impacts is not known to the Congress,
and is not readily calculable, during the legislative process. Furthermore,
the only institution potentially able to take these impacts into account
(the EPA), like most administrative or regulatory agencies, is not struc-
tured to respond properly. In the first place, the EPA has little choice but
to implement regulations mandated by the Congress. The agency cannot
explicitly, and probably cannot even implicitly, decide that costs exceed
possible benefits—either in the aggregate or even in local situations—
and weaken the standards. Secondly, most administrative agencies will
be lobbied and pressured by groups motivated by distributional impacts.
But it is not clear that many agencies are institutionally structured to
respond explicitly and rationally to such pressures. Thus, agency decisions
undoubtedly reflect responses to "politically" motivated pressures, but
we can have little confidence that these are socially appropriate responses
for which an agency can or should be held accountable.
A final problem with the regulatory approach—and, in our view, the
biggest weakness of our model—relates to uncertainty. A large array of
complex and poorly understood factors influence the final regulations
and their impacts. They range from the dynamic market structure of an
industry, and its rate of technological change, to the narrow bureaucratic
behavior of a regulatory agency. The effects of these and many other
elements on promulgated standards are virtually impossible to predict,
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these uncertainties are not simply the conventional absence of information
about the probability of various exogenously determined stochastic
outcomes. Much uncertainty of regulatory effects is endogenous to the
process. Incremental decisions of each participant, public and private,
at each step in the development and promulgation of regulations, alter
market structures and condition the subsequent behavior of individual
firms and political actors. Given the magnitudes of the microlevel
impacts of even small administrative decisions, we would expect that
the endogenous character of uncertainty would significantly affect
decisionmaking processes.
The length and complexity of the theoretical empirical exercise we have
described in this paper should, by itself, be evidence for one of our
principal conclusions: If it is easy for legislators to pass regulations, it is
far from easy to accommodate adequately the complex and indirect effects
of these regulations in the policymaking process. This suggests to us the
need for caution in adopting regulatory prescriptions for social ills.
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Professors Robert Dorfman, Malcolm Getz, John Meyer, and Roger Schmenner for their
critical comments during the progress of this research. We are indebted to Gene Flood for
his efforts to satisfy our constantly expanding data requirements.
Notes
1. See, for example, Kneese and Schultze 1975; Jacoby and Steinbruner 1973; National
Academy of Sciences 1974. These studies examine policies intended to improve environ-
mental quality, but reflect a continuing focus of analysts on the wider problems of controlling
externalities through government regulation. A more general "Study of Federal Regulation"
is now being prepared by the Committee on Government Affairs of the U.S. Senate. Much
of the literature on regulation now focuses on issues of regulatory reform. This volume
itself is a product of such a focus. See also Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory
Reform 1977 and any issue of Regulation, a magazine published by the American Enterprise
Institute of Washington, D.C. Theoretical analysis of regulatory reform proposals fill the
pages of the Bell Journal. Indeed, articles on regulatory reform are too numerous to mention.
For a concise discussion of general principles, see Edley 1977.
2. National Academy of Science 1974 illustrates the complexities of this type of study.
For a more disaggregated treatment of similar issues see Harrison 1975.
3. See Buchanan and Tullock 1975 for a discussion of some distributional consequences
of different forms of regulation.
4. In our terminology, quasirents equal the difference between price and economic costs for
new facilities, and the difference between price and variable costs for existing facilities.
5. The present value of S2.45/ton-year at a 10 percent discount rate is $24.50. The $24.50
rate is the present value of the time stream of the annually varying price increases actually
forecast in Leone et al. 1975.Political Economy: Water-Pollution Controls 269
6. In other differences, the House version authorized an additional $4 billion for construc-
tion of local treatment plants, limited the EPA's control over state permit programs, re-
stricted the ability of environmental groups to sue industry and the federal government
over implementation of the act, and created an Environmental Financing Agency to help
local governments pay their share of treatment-plant construction costs.
7. The other three all contain references to issues unrelated to the regulation of water
quality, such as the authority of the Appropriations Committee, which make them poor
indicators of the position of representatives on the issue of effluent standards.
8. For readers familiar with Guttman scales, this scale has a coefficient of reproducibility
of 0.96 and a minimal marginal reproducibility of 0.77. These terms indicate that 96 percent
of all votes cast fit the pattern (anything over 90 percent is considered a good scale) and that
77 percent could be correctly predicted by assuming that all representatives voted with the
majority on each roll call.
9. The estimation procedure recognizes that the voting variable is a set of ordinal categories
based on voting patterns described in tables 5.1 and 5.2. We do not know where each amend-
ment is located on some underlying proregulation dimension, and we have grouped together
representatives who may have different true positions but whose positions fall between
the same two amendments. These problems make the dependent variable an interval
measure of support for the regulations and thus inappropriate for ordinary least-squares
regression. The estimation procedure used in this case is the w-chotomous extension of the
multivariate probit model, which estimates both the location of the amendments and the
parameters of the underlying relationship with the explanatory variables that make the
observed grouping of legislators most likely. For a complete discussion, see Zavoina and
McKelvey 1975.
10. The estimated equation is log(Willingness to pay) = -0.78 - 0.62 x South + 0.04
x Midwest + 0.19 x West + 0.34 x Suburb - 0.11 x Town - 0.58 x Rural - 0.33
x log(Family size) — 0.53 x log(Age) + 1.51 x log(Education) + 0.99 x log(Income).
11. Demographic data on congressional districts are available for the session beginning
in 1973. Unfortunately, the massive redistricting demanded by the courts after the 1970
census significantly altered most districts' composition, making the 1973 data useless for
analyzing votes in 1972.
12. Our own analysis shows that this is too simplistic a representation of a complex reality.
For example, eleven of thirteen tissue-paper manufacturers in New England suffered a
deterioration of relative competitive advantage due to the 1977 standards, but twelve of the
thirteen actually reap a competitive advantage when the standards are tightened to the
1983 level. See Meyer and Leone 1978.
13. -0.003 x $10/ton x [(6,500 tons/day)/10
3] = -0.20.
14. (-0.18 - 0.003 x 6$/ton) x [(6,500 tons/day)/10
3] = -1.30.
15. These 64 mills have a total capacity, by our estimate, of 2.9 million metric tons of
tissue per year. Lockwood's estimate of "practical maximum capacity" is 4.0 million tons
per year. The difference stems, first, from problems associated with identification of the
capacity of a single product in multiproduct operations, and, second and more important,
from the lack of publicly available information on the capacity of several important mills
in this industry. The magnitude of this difference is disturbing, but, practically and conceptu-
ally, our results do not appear sensitive to this discrepancy.
16. These are total economic costs; that is, they include a 15 percent return on investment.
17. These are total accounting costs; that is, they include depreciation and other fixed
charges but exclude a return on investment.Leone and Jackson 270
18. A third explanation is that this industry does not operate according to strictly competi-
tive principles. Our cost estimates are not sufficiently accurate to permit us to make a
judgment on this point.
19. Astute managers may make capital investment decisions in a regulated environment
on the basis of this effect. See Greening and Leone 1977. As significant regulations (par-
ticularly, price controls of one form or another) become more pervasive, this may be an
increasingly common managerial practice.
20. Variable costs of manufacturing plus variable costs of BAT. In other words, economic
costs of BAT determine whether a mill will or will not comply; but once this decision is
made, prices will be set on the basis of variable costs alone.
21. Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1977) estimated the price elasticity of demand for tissue to be
-0.45.
22. This was the advice of Ivan Metzger of Belmar, N.J., water and waste-water program
management consultant to this and numerous other projects.
23. For a more detailed discussion of administrative reactions to the competitive effects
described here, see Koch and Leone 1979.
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Allen V. Kneese
I am extremely impressed with the research reported in this paper.
General statements about indirect effects of pollution-control regulations
and about the distribution of costs and benefits among firms, regions,
and individuals are to be found in the literature, but this paper represents
the most far-reaching attempt at quantification of these effects and of
linking the results to the political processes involved in implementation
that I have seen. The authors' research has yielded some important
insights. For example, I blush to admit that it had never occurred to me
that some (or, as the authors show, perhaps many) firms in an industry
could actually benefit from pollution regulation. This is an important
finding that, again as the authors show, may yield important insights
into both the legislation and the implementation of pollution-control
policy.
Editor's note: At the conference, Professor Kneese provided a brief legislative history of
various water-pollution-control amendments. For a full discussion see Kneese and Schultze
1975 (listed in references above).Comment
Richard Zeckhauser
Contemporary theories of government regulation are distressingly in-
complete. Rarely are their assumptions or conclusions put to rigorous
test. In many ways this is understandable. At least in the federal sphere,
a single agency is generally responsible for dealing with a particular
problem; we have no opportunity to make judicious comparisons among
different regulatory approaches. Variation occurs only over time, with
too many factors changing simultaneously to permit strong conclusions.
Many of the most important variables elude quantification.
When solid data are not available, it becomes all the more important
to pull together every shard of information. This is not easy to do in the
area of regulation. An understanding of political science, empirical
analysis, economic model building, and business behavior would be
required for an effective "assembly job." This is what Leone, a business
administration professor with a background in economics, and Jackson,
a quantitatively oriented professor of political science, have attempted
in this article, which explores the links between political decisions on
regulation and their anticipated economic consequences. That their
success is limited does not diminish their accomplishment.
This is an ambitious and unconventional article, ranging widely from
theoretical models to empirical analyses, from legislative to adminis-
trative behavior, from the purely economic to the predominantly political,
from broad economic magnitudes to data on individual mills. Some
exercises are more successful than others.
The authors are to be applauded, for instance, for undertaking statis-
tical work to explain congressional voting patterns on environmental
legislation. The data, however, do not fully support their conclusion
that "congressional voting on the 1972 amendments was sensitive to
the potential direct economic effects on a district." Only one of the five
variables they employ to represent economic activity affected results
in a statistically significant manner. Two had values not worth distin-
guishing from zero. Of the remaining two, which are about equal in
significance, one had a sign contrary to prediction. Hardly an impressive
record.
Leone and Jackson then go on to a more sophisticated model, whichZeckhauser 274
if validated would be a considerable contribution. The notion is that
firms may be primarily concerned with the way environmental impo-
sitions will affect their position within their industry, rather than with
the effect on the industry in general. Through a more sophisticated inves-
tigation, a firm may determine that a proposed regulation would hurt
it less than others and would thus represent a source of competitive
advantage. In this case, the congressional representatives of relatively
advantaged firms might be more receptive to the proposed legislation.
This hypothesis should appeal particularly to economic determinists
and regulatory cynics. It goes one step beyond the common refrain that
once regulation is imposed, the surviving members of the industry are
likely to welcome its continuance. Leone and Jackson suggest that firms
will make an a priori assessment of whether proposed regulatory measures
will hurt or help them relative to their competitors. The observed voting
patterns do not validate this hypothesis. It is not clear, however, whether
firms do not make such assessments or whether congressmen do not
vote according to the interests of firms within their districts.
Indeed, the sad news is that the variables that are most significant
statistically are the very ones we would have suspected were important
had we never heard of economics: geographic region and party affilia-
tion. (There is so much collinearity between "South" and Southern
Democrat" that it is hard to know what to make of the interaction be-
tween region and party.) One other variable is significant: the age of
the representative. Leone and Jackson merely conclude that "younger
representatives show preferences for more stringent regulations than
older ones." Perhaps age is just the correlate here, and the real factor
is recency of election. If the electorate is becoming more sensitive to the
environment, and if incumbents have some tendency to adhere to their
former views, then the newly elected, who are likely to be younger, are
also likely to be more environment-minded. Alternatively, a long in-
cumbency may merely provide concentrated political interests (in this
case, it would be those opposed to environmental programs) greater
opportunity to exert their pressures.
Leone and Jackson have constructed an interesting independent vari-
able for their vote-prediction model, basically a count of how many
proenvironment issues a congressman has favored. Such constructed
variables, when there is a natural spectrum but not a natural scale, may
have unusual properties—particularly when there is a clustering at one
extreme, as there was here with the proenvironment group. The use of
variables of this sort demands caution in testing hypotheses or drawingComment on Leone and Jackson 275
any other statistical conclusions. To avoid misinterpretation, the authors
should have said a bit more about their estimation techniques.
In the last portion of their article, Leone and Jackson delve into specific
data on the tissue industry. They go down to the level of individual mills
to judge differential cost impacts and differential effects in terms of
quasirents (and in some cases viability itself) in the face of EPA effluent
standards. These standards were proposed in 1975, revised in 1976 in
response to industry comment, and revised once again when they became
final in 1977. By exploring how the EPA responded to the predicted
effects of its impositions on the distribution of quasirents, the authors
hope to shed light on administrative decisionmaking in general. Their
central hypothesis is that political pressure would lead the EPA to design
its standards to pursue what might be perceived as equity objectives as
opposed to those of efficiency (equal marginal cost of cleanup across
firms). Equity, as always, is an ambiguous concept. At the very least,
however, it would seem to connote that some firms should not be driven
out of business while others suffer mildly or even benefit. That is the
interpretation it is given here. Unfortunately, insufficient data prevent
the authors from testing this hypothesis.
In formulating this hypothesis, Leone and Jackson are in accord with
much contemporary thinking about the formulation of government
policy. In response to both political pressure and appeals to equity,
government agencies and actors (legislative, administrative, and ex-
ecutive) are thought to avoid solutions that would impose large costs
on an identified group of parties. In future studies, perhaps of other
industries, it seems likely that the authors could bear out their models
and conjectures.
The chief weakness of this article is that it conveys little useful factual
knowledge. To some extent this may be due to inadequate data. Some
of the major hypotheses, however, may remain unvalidated for a more
fundamental reason: they may simply not be true. If so, disproof would
be an important contribution in itself.
At least in the deductive portions of the article, Leone and Jackson
have carried economic models of political phenomena beyond con-
ventional analyses. They suggest that both agency and legislative de-
cisions will be strongly influenced by economic consequences, and further
that it may be important to consider the distributional consequences
within an industry and to distinguish short- and long-term effects. They
raise two important questions that remain open: Can the behavior of
political and bureaucratic man, or at least his actions in the regulatoryZeckhauser 276
arena, be explained as a response to economic factors? If so, can he or
his constituents and pressure groups be as sophisticated in their assess-
ments as are the models of this paper? This ambitious essay suggests
that future efforts by Leone and Jackson may make an important con-
tribution to resolving these issues.